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Romm v. Flax: 
COURT OF APPEALS 
REJECTS LITERAL 
DEFINITION OF 
"VOID" AS IT 
APPEARS IN THE 




In Romm v. Flax, 340 
Md. 690, 668 A.2d 1 (1995), 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land held that the term "void," 
as it appears in the context of 
section 1 0-702(g)( 1) of the Real 
Property Article of the Anno-
tated Code of Maryland, means 
"voidable at the option of the 
purchaser," instead of its literal 
definition, "of no legal force or 
effect." In so holding, the court 
prevented sellers from 
benefitting from their failure to 
supply purchasers with a dis-
closure or disclaimer statement 
as required under the Real Prop-
erty Article. 
On.February 19, 1994, 
Lawrence and Elaine Flax 
("sellers") signed a contract to 
sell their house to Barry and 
Marcy Romm ("purchasers"). 
The contract included an ad-
dendum designated "Notice of 
Purchaser's Right to Property 
Condition Disclosure Statement 
or Disclaimer Statement" which 
established, as required by sec-
tion 10-702 ofthe Real Proper-
ty Article, that the purchasers 
were entitled to receive a writ-
ten residential property condi-
tion disclosure statement or a 
written residential property dis-
claimer statement from the sell-
ers. The addendum further stat-
ed, also in accord with the code 
section, that if the sellers deliv-
ered the disclosure or disclaim-
er statement more than three 
days after entry into a contract 
of sale with the purchasers, then 
the contract would be "void." 
At the time the contract of sale 
was signed, the sellers did not 
furnish, nor did the purchasers 
request, the required disclaim-
er or disclosure statement. 
Subsequent to the con-
tract's execution, the sellers re-
fused the purchasers' requestto 
inspect the property, despite the 
factthat inspection was required 
by the terms of the contract. On 
February 24, five days after the 
contract was signed, the pur-
chasers requested in writing and 
through their attorney an in-
spection of the property. On 
March 4, in response to the pur-
chasers' request for an inspec-
tion, the sellers' attorney re-
sponded that his clients' failure 
to provide a disclosure or dis-
claimer statement rendered the 
contract void. 
The purchasers filed a 
complaint and motion for sum-
mary judgment in the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County 
on March 17, 1994. In their 
complaint, the buyers sought 
specific performance of the con-
tract and money damages. On 
December 12, 1994 , circuit 
court Judge Durke G. Thomp-
son denied the purchasers' mo-
tion for summary judgment but 
granted the sellers' motion for 
summary judgment, holding 
that their failure to provide a 
disclosure or disclaimer state-
ment as required under the con-
tract rendered the contract void. 
The purchasers appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Mary land, but before the court 
of special appeals heard the case, 
the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land granted certiorari. 
The court began its anal-
ysis by noting that carrying out 
the legislative intent of a statute 
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is "the cardinal rule" in statuto-
ry construction. Flax, 340 Md. 
at 693, 668 A.2d at 2 (1995) 
(quoting Tucker v. Fireman's 
Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 
69, 73, 517 A.2d 730 (1986)). 
Further, the court explained that 
a dictionary is the starting point, 
but not necessarily the ending 
point, of interpreting contro-
versiallanguage in a statute. Id. 
(citing Morris v. Prince 
George's County, 319 Md. 597, 
606, 573 A.2d 1346 (1990)). 
Expressing its desire to avoid 
results which are '"illogical,''' 
"'unreasonable,'" or "'incon-
sistent with common sense,'" 
the court explained that it ap-
praises not onl y the usual mean-
ing of ambiguous terms, but 
also the goals of the statute in 
question. Id. (quoting Tucker, 
308 Md. at 75, 517 A.2d at 
732. 
Applying this rationale, 
the court next turned to section 
10-702 of the Real Property Ar-
ticle of the Maryland Code. 
Flax, 340 at 694,668 A.2d at 3. 
The code states, in pertinent 
part, that "[i]f the disclosure 
statement is deli vered later than 
three days after the vendor en-
ters into a contract of sale with 
the purchaser, the contract is 
void." /d. (citing Md. Code 
Ann., Real Prop. section 10-
702(g)(1) (1974, 1988 Repl. 
Vol., 1994 Supp.)). Inorderto 
ascertain the General Assem-
bly's intent when enacting sec-
tion 1 0-702(g)( 1), the court 
looked to the legislative history 
of the section, located in Chap-
ter 640 of the Acts of 1993. The 
court concluded that the stat-
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ute's intended purposes includ-
ed "[ r ]equiring a vendor of cer-
tain real property to deliver to a 
purchaser a certain disclosure 
statement or disclaimer state-
ment," and "[p ]roviding that a 
purchaser has a right to rescind 
a contract of sale of real proper-
ty under certain circumstanc-
es." Id. at 694-95,668 A.2d at 
3. 
Seeking to avoid a re-
sult inconsistent with legisla-
tive intent, the court explained 
that if the term "void" was giv-
en its literal definition, then sell-
ers of real property would "ben-
efit from their failure to comply 
with the law," which requires 
them to provide disclosure or 
disclaimer statements to huy-
ers. /d. at 695, 668 A.2d at 3. 
This rationale was in accord 
with an opinion of the Attorney 
General which expressed that 
"it is hard to see why a law 
intended to aid buyers would 
victimize the unwary buyer[ s] 
by giving a seller who entered a 
contract without delivering a 
statement the great advantage 
of three risk-free days to look 
around for a better offer." /d. 
(quoting 79 Op.Att'y Gen. _,6 
n. 5 (March 11, 1994)). Thus, 
contrary to the sellers' position, 
the court found no evidence of 
legislative authority in support 
of granting sellers a right of 
rescission in this situation. Flax, 
340 Md. at 695,668 A.2d at 3. 
The court of appeals 
further explained that interpret-
ing "void" to mean "null and 
void" in the context of section 
10-702 would convert real es-
tate contracts signed before the 
required disclosure or disclaim-
er statements are delivered into 
"option contracts exercisable by 
the sellers only." Id. The court 
noted that the term "void" in 
contracts rarely means "of no 
legal force or effect," but in-
stead evidences that one party's 
duty is conditioned upon the 
other party's performance. Id. 
at 696, 668 A.2d at 3 (quoting 
Corbin on Contracts section 
761 at517-18(1960)). Accord-
ingly, the purpose of such a 
contract provision is "to limit 
the duty of the purchaser" and 
not "to give a loophole of es-
cape ... to the seller." Id. at 696, 
668 A.2dat4. Finally, the court 
explained that it had previously 
rejected the literal meaning of 
"void" when holding otherwise 
would alter the principles of 
justice and equity by allowing 
one party to thwart contract 
enforcement by preventing a 
condition precedent. Id. (citing 
Brewer v. Sowers, 118 Md. 681, 
86 A. 228 (1912)). 
In Romm v. Flax, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland 
held that the term "void," as it 
appears in section 10-702 of the 
Real Property Article of the 
Annotated Code of Maryland, 
is not to be interpreted literally. 
Doing so would alter the com-
mon law and contradict legisla-
tive intent by creating a new 
class of option contracts exer-
cisable only by sellers who 
refuse to comply with the law. 
Instead, "void" carries the con-
tractual meaning, "voidable at 
the option of the buyer." This 
decision protects an unwary 
buyer from a seller who, before 
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this decision, could deliberate-
ly forego his or her obligations
under the code and in return,
receive a three day "grace peri-
od" in which to search for better
offers after entering a contract
of sale. Perhaps more signifi-
cantly, the court wisely pre-
servedthe goals which the Gen-
eral Assembly intended this stat-
ute to accomplish when enact-
ing it as part of Maryland law.
- Nicole M. Zell
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This imposing, Italiante style brick building is the architectural centerpiece of Bel Air,
Maryland, and home of the first Harford County court. Featuring a formally appointed second-
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government.
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